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From: "Robert Hooi" <rwlh21@sbcglobal.net>
Date: August 19, 2014 9:13:58 AM CDT
To: <Undisclosed-Recipient:;>
Subject: 45 Years Later: What's the Mission?
A little "old" but still a good article.
Apollo 11, 45 Years Later: What's the Mission?
- 07.17.14
- 9:08 AM
Sixty-six years after that first tentative flight of the Wright Brothers at Kittyhawk, North Carolina, Apollo 11 landed on the moon.
As of this month, it's been 45 years since that landing, and 43 years since the last steps were taken on the moon. It seems longer.
The Apollo lunar exploration program was an enormous and spectacular undertaking. Almost 400,000 people and 5% of the national budget went into the endeavor. Then, in 1972 with Apollo 17, we simply stopped cold. The Apollo 18 rocket sent Skylab aloft in 1973; the Apollo 19 and 20 rockets languish in museums, along with four spare Lunar Modules. Collectively, they are the most expensive exhibits ever built.
To some, the termination of this program and 30 years of the space shuttle inspires only indifference. Others feel resentment at opportunities lost. Still others simply ask themselves, "What happened?" The answers are, as always, complicated… but at the core of this lack of forward progress is a simple truth: our leadership lacks the will to achieve grand endeavors in space.
Much of the innovation and advancement that bridged the Mercury program's suborbital flights in 1961 to the first lunar landing in 1969 took place during that short 8-year span. It was a time of amazing invention and progress, and resulted in dramatic achievements. It can be hard to comprehend today, it seems so astounding and so long ago. We rushed out to the moon, driven by nationalistic fervor and flying right at the limits of 1960's technology. The Apollo flight computer operated on about 36k. The watches the astronauts wore were wind-up Omegas. Most people saw the landings on black and white TV sets. This was a long time ago.
The progress that has occurred in spaceflight since the last Apollo flight in 1972 has been largely incremental, not revolutionary. The US Congress and executive branch as a whole backed away from deep-space exploration even as the moon landings played out, and the "cheaper" alternative of a reusable space shuttle was sought. While the shuttle was ultimately built and flown for three decades, it was neither efficient nor revolutionary. It was an under-budgeted and ultimately expensive compromise, a shadow of its original design, that resulted in dangerous spacecraft that never came close to its advertised potential. The shuttle flew a few times per year (instead of the weekly flight rate that was promised in some quarters), cost far more than projected to operate (as much as $1.5 billion per flight instead of the $20 million once projected by NASA). And the program spent far too much time on its knees recovering from flight calamities and near-misses. It was an inefficient way to get to Low Earth Orbit, and kept us there for 30 years.
We did build a space station – the ISS – and that was assembled primarily using the shuttle. But it would have assuredly been a far more effective and less costly program had we been using more traditional large expendable rockets like the Saturn V, especially had it been evolved over the 130 flights the shuttle undertook (of course, we will never know that for certain). And while the ISS is an impressive achievement and returns good science, it is viewed by many as a bit of a white elephant. When polled, most people were, again, indifferent; others were not even aware of its existence, or thought that it had crashed (doubtless mixing fragmentary notions of Skylab's demise and shuttle accidents). The complacency of the general public towards the space station is staggering.
To be clear, not all progress and innovation in spaceflight is going to look like the Apollo program, nor should it. But in much the same way that airplanes look very similar today to what flew in the early 1960's, much progress in spaceflight is an evolution of good ideas that have gone before. After an expensive flirtation with supersonic passenger carriers (SST's) in the 1960's and 1970's (resulting in Concorde's long but terribly expensive run), virtually all the airliners of today are variations of the blunt-nosed design established by the Boeing 707 in 1958. But jet engine technology has quietly evolved into far more efficient and reliable designs, and avionics have moved from mechanical/hydraulic systems to computerized electronics and fly-by-wire, to cite just two examples. In much the same way, we are seeing a return to space capsules and traditional rocket boosters in space exploration after our long detour with the winged space shuttle.
Why? Because capsules work – they are effective, reliable and comparatively cheap. NASA and the private space companies such as SpaceX and Boeing recognize this. Notably, there are the exceptions – Sierra Nevada's Dreamchaser, Virgin Galactic's Spaceship One and Xcor's Lynx – which are small spaceplanes, but for the most part these are intended for short-hop suborbital operations and are themselves based largely on former Air Force and NASA research projects. Only the Dreamchaser is intended to reach the space station; how soon is anyone's guess. Capsule development is faster and easier, as evidenced by SpaceX, Boeing and NASA's Orion.
What will be the mission of these new and improved spacecraft? SpaceX will ferry tourists to orbital destinations in its Dragon Version 2 capsule, and Boeing intends (tentatively) to employ its CST100capsule primarily in support of the space station. NASA is currently planning the asteroid redirect.
This progress toward less expensive access to orbit is necessary and welcome. But for those awaiting a spectacular mission for NASA, a long-term trek back into deep space to stay, prepare to wait much longer.
NASA struggles to be heard above the furor of congressional sniping and lukewarm direction from the executive branch. The asteroid redirect program is currently the crewed mission objective of choice, though even that has been downsized as the funds have been trimmed. Initially, the Space Launch System (NASA's current Saturn V class superbooster project) and Orion spacecraft were to deliver astronauts to a near-Earth asteroid for a program of deep-space asteroid exploration. That has now been scaled down to a smaller asteroid which will be lassoed by an unmanned craft – an asteroid "tug" – that will maneuver it to lunar orbit, and the astronauts will go and visit it there, closer to home base.
Or perhaps I should say "might," for if the cancelled Constellation moon program is any indication (President Obama terminated it in 2009, after NASA had spent billions*), the next incoming administration may well cancel the asteroid rendezvous. There are a number of agendas in play within Congress and the GOP. In any case, with just .5% of the federal budget going to NASA and their vast array of projects, it's hard to see that program, and the required SLS, coming to fruition (in contrast, at its peak Apollo spent almost 5%, or ten times as much). As NASA administrator Charlie Bolden said last year, "NASA can only do so many things…" and this does not, by his estimate, include a return to the moon within his lifetime. It may not even include the asteroid redirect.
A recent National Research Council report commissioned by Congress stated it fairly succinctly. Speaking in this case of a Mars mission, but in language applicable to the moon as well, it said that these programs"[Cannot] succeed without a sustained commitment on the part of those who govern the nation — a commitment that does not change direction with succeeding electoral cycles. Those branches of government responsible for NASA's funding and guidance are therefore critical enablers of the nation's investment and achievements in human spaceflight." Hear, hear. It went on to elaborate: "The horizon goal for human space exploration is Mars. All long-range space programs, by all potential partners, for human space exploration converge on this goal."
If Mars is a long-term goal… the question before us is, what pathway to take while we build this capability? The report concluded that, "it was … clear to the committee … that a return to extended surface operations on the Moon would make significant contributions to a strategy ultimately aimed at landing people on Mars."
Mr. Bolden and Congress appear to be looking at different playbooks.
The asteroid redirect project is hotly opposed in various quarters. Many in Congress want to return to the moon long-term, and some experts want to press directly towards Mars instead – either to a landing on one its moons or directly to the surface (a mission to a Martian moon would be far less expensive and easier). In more succinct terms, Representative Lamar Smith (R), Chair of the House Science Committee, calls the asteroid rendezvous program "Uninspiring." In his view, and that of many others, both the moon and Mars are worthy goals far more impressive. Another Republican, Steven Palazzo, who chairs the Space Subcommittee, echoed the sentiments of decades of expert opinion when he stated that the moon is "A training ground for venturing further into the solar system." He called the asteroid redirect a "detour." A number of Democrats quietly agree.
There are dissenting voices, of course… Dr. Louis Friedman, a founder of the Planetary Society (and co-lead of the Keck Institute of Space Studies' Asteroid Retrieval Study at Caltech, it should be noted) recently opined that House reactions to asteroid rendezvous were simply a case of disagreement with anything stamped "Obama," and that "The industry and NASA are pretty much behind asteroid redirect."
Clearly, there is currently little consensus on the specific direction of human spaceflight and a defining mission. The net result is ongoing uncertainly.
We continue to build, slowly, the SLS rocket booster and the Orion capsule, but without a clear (and funded) long-term mission for either. It is not beyond possibility that the asteroid rendezvous/redirect mission was dictated primarily to give the SLS/Orion combo an affordable mission objective; something to do. Of course, in its ultimate form, the SLS/Orion system can be applied towards either asteroid redirect or the moon or Mars – it is a matter of tailoring the machines to the mission.
Specialization need not occur yet – but we cannot continue to kick the can down the road for long. A decision on a firm direction in human spaceflight is needed, and soon, or SLS/Orion may ultimately follow the fate of the Constellation program. The SLS is expensive, and only a long-term program will amortize it properly. A few jaunts to captured asteroids will not be enough. It is worth noting that Constellation was ultimately thought to be a $100 billion program; asteroid rendezvous is tentatively budgeted at $3 billion. Neither number is likely to be accurate; the former is likely high (encouraging cancellation), the latter low (encouraging adoption). It's the biased nature of the funding beast.
One reason that companies like SpaceX and Virgin Galacticare making such impressive strides in comparison is that they have a clear mission directive (usually spelled-out by a charismatic leader such as Elon Musk or Richard Branson) and can draw on technology pioneered and tested by NASA over previous decades. But for NASA itself to prosper, a consensus much be reached, firm and clear goals established, and reliable funding assured – funding that will survive Presidential election cycles and the whims of Congress, including pressure from lobbyists. This is exactly what has been proposed by some congressmen and senators, as well as outside supporters of NASA's efforts, but it falls upon largely deaf ears. The existing process is well-entrenched and profitable.
The current jewels in NASA's crown are the robotic explorations of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. Doing much with slim funding, JPL has continued to exceed our expectations (and often their own) mission after mission. Obvious examples are the Mars rovers – Curiosity continues to explore two years after its extremely risky landing, and Opportunity has been traversing Mars for over a decade – as well as the solar-system crossing Voyagers . But these programs, impressive as they are, do not put human lives at risk and are far smaller in their execution. And even these robotic efforts are enduring budget cuts, regardless of their spectacular successes.
NASA has over the years been one of the most innovative organizations in history. The space race years were a high water mark in human accomplishment. The agency has continued this trend since then, albeit as a diminished pace with less obvious achievements. Much of this is evolutionary – the simple fact is that the first decade in space was the hardest to accomplish. But this innovative spirit, and the overall sense of mission that drives it, is at risk. Our national space program is crawling and the rudder guiding it is being twitched from port to starboard with endless uncertainty.
We need select bold ideas and build a politically united commitment to increased and reliable space funding. We need a clear set of agreed-upon goals for the next ten years at a minimum. We should send a workable percentage of this funding to the private space sector, encouraging growth there, and hire them to service Low Earth Orbit. SpaceX and others do this now at a price, and the costs will diminish as they continue and compete.
Finally, we must commit NASA to the continuing exploration of deep space and the greater heavens. Because that is what they do best, that is what we created the agency to achieve, and that is their ultimate destiny.
Rod Pyle is author of multiple best-selling books on space exploration and innovation.
*The Constellation program, which consisted of two large Saturn V-class rockets, the Orion capsule, a smaller crew-ferrying booster and a lunar lander, was killed after the publication of the "Augustine Report" in 2009. This document stated that the funding levels projected for NASA would not allow it to be completed and flown as intended. Rather than increasing funds and building on what had already been spent, it was scrapped (except for Orion). Notable critics of the cancellation included Neil Armstrong of Apollo 11, Jim Lovell of Apollo 13 and Gene Cernan of Apollo 17.
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